Abduction is a topic that attracts much interest in AI and automated reasoning research. Di erent approaches have been devised, that give a formalized account of explanatory reasoning, propose methods to compute explanations, frame abduction in the context of logic programming. However, the logical nature of abduction is still far from being clear and di erent speci cations of the key underlying concepts have been given, that make it di cult to speak of abduction as a single wellde ned form of reasoning.
Introduction
Abduction is a natural form of reasoning in any scienti c eld where new knowledge may be gained by observation of real world facts. It is also a common form of everyday reasoning and its formalization has recently attracted much attention in the AI community. In fact, abduction plays an important role in intelligent problem solving tasks such as diagnosis, natural language interpretation, plan recognition and many others aspects yet not deeply investigated, like program debugging.
The rst e orts to formalize explanation based reasoning come from the area of diagnostic problem solving, where two fundamental approaches have been devised: the consistency based approach pioneered by de Kleer 6] and formalized by Reiter 30] and the abductive approach introduced by Reggia 29 ], Cox and Pietrzykowsky 5] and Poole 28] . Poole 26] and successively Console and Torasso 4] have shown under which restrictions the two approaches compute the same explanations, and Konolige 18] generalized their results. The formulation proposed by Konolige is based on the de nition of a causal theory, where explanations are conjunctions of atomic sentences belonging to a prede ned set. Consistency based and abductive diagnosis are compared and generalized in the context of causal theories. A discussion on the
Preference
The initial informal view of abduction relates it to the notion of explanation: is abduced from means that is a good reason for the truth of . The statement that abductive reasoning is the inference of from the premisses ! and betrays its primitive meaning, by attening explanatory implication into material implication. The two notions cannot be confused; they enjoy di erent properties. For example, assume that A observes that her co ee is sweet enough; a good reason for it is that some spoon of sugar has been added to the co ee; however, it is not true that another reason for the co ee to be sweet is that some spoon of sugar has been added to the co ee and some spoon of salt has been added to the co ee. That is, monotonicity generally fails for explanatory implication. However, abduction cannot be reduced to a form of non monotonic reasoning. This appears, for instance, when noticing that another property which explanatory implicationdoes not enjoy in general is re exivity, not only because explaining a fact by itself is a rhetoric assertion, but mainly because simpler explanations may exist and, since Galileo, out of two hypotheses, the simpler is to be preferred.
The notion of preference between hypotheses is indeed the key problem of abduction and what makes it di erent from logical implication: not every assumption that implies an observed phenomenon explains it. Among such alternative hypotheses a preference relation is assumed such that only the most preferred ones are actually to be taken as explanations.
Preference criteria have been stated in many di erent ways, from absolutely general to very empirical ones. Peirce 23] says that`all our knowledge may be said to rest upon observed facts' and that`observed facts do not, in themselves, contain any practical knowledge. Such knowledge must involve addition to the facts observed'. Addition consists in preferring simpler hypotheses, where simplicity is intended as a qualitative property that is not reducible to a logical one.
Harman, in 14] argues that the inference to the best explanation is a judgment based on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, which is more plausible, which explains more which is less as hoc, and so forth (pp. 89). He does not provide criteria to make such a choice. Thagard, arguing against the lack of methodological issues in Harman, gives in 32] precise criteria to make this choice:
Inference to the best explanation is inference to the theory that best satis es the criteria of consilience and simplicity, as well as a third: analogy (pp. 89) 1 . The notion of consilience can be summarized as follows: a theory T 1 is more consilient than a theory T 2 if the set of phenomena that T 1 explains is greater than the set of phenomena explained by T 2 . Under this view, no logical approach can be taken; otherwise an inconsistent theory would be maximally consilient. Di erently from the two preceding authors, Hempel gives a logical account for the theory of explanations, introducing in 15], the notion of systematic power on which basis explanatory theories are compared. The notion of preference, in fact, is based on that of explanatory power of a theory, namely an explanatory theory is to be preferred over another one 4 Abduction is not Deduction-in-Reverse whenever, together with the background theory, the rst explains more than the latter. However the way preference is formally de ned does not raise the same problems as in Harman. In the AI literature, preference has been given two main criteria of choice, both based on semantic and syntactic considerations:
1. context-dependent and 2. context-independent. The rst one is adopted by Boutilier and Becher 1], whose approach can be formulated as follows. Given the logics CT O4 or CO and a CTO4 or CO-revision model of the agent's knowledge K, if the explanandum is accepted (i.e. is veri ed in some world of the model), then an explanans is preferred if it is true in all the most plausible worlds in which also is true. The conditional model of Boutilier and Becher has the advantage of allowing revision of a theory with which an interesting explanans may be inconsistent. However, under their criterion of preference, itself is a preferred explanans, as well as any propositional tautology.
This view, furthermore, does not account for the asymmetry between explanations: sentences true in the same worlds of the same model behave equivalently, so that given two explanantes and for the same observation , if , and are true out of the same worlds, then is also an explanans for . Many arguments have been given against the symmetry of explanations. See, for example, 33].
By contrast, the context-independent notion of preference is a purely logical relation between assertion. It has been widely adopted in the AI approach to abduction. For example, in the logic programming context, a clause that subsumes is preferred to . In 20] preference is de ned as`being simpler', where a (propositional) formula is simpler than whenever the set of literals occurring in is a subset of those occurring in . In the case of abduction in full rst order logic 21, 2], is preferred to whenever ! is valid. See also 5, 30, 7, 25, 34] .
All the above context-independent views of preference can be summed up by saying that is an explanans for with respect to a background knowledge i 1. f g j= and 2. is preferred, i.e. for all 0 such that f 0 g j= , if j= ! 0 then j= 0 ! . In such a view, preference between hypotheses is`absolute' and purely logical in nature. There is no place for a theory of preference that describes how preference is to be measured in a given context.
Against the context-independent view of preference it can be argued that the request for a theory of preference relies on a crucial issue. Each domain has its laws of preference. If these laws are considered together with the agent's background knowledge then the properties of logical implication risk not to be faithful to the standard meaning of preference { as we have seen above, discussing context-dependent preference. Not considering them makes preference a purely logical issue completely independent of the domain the agent is dealing with.
Both views can be settled within the same framework if an abductive structure is de ned as consisting of a couple of theories, and , where is the background theory expressing the agent's current knowledge of the world, and is the theory Abduction is not Deduction-in-Reverse 5 embodying the preference criteria governing the domain relative to the task that the agent has to perform.
In such a view, an explanans for an explanandum in the abductive structure h ; i is such that:
explains with respect to the background knowledge (i.e. ; j= ) and is a preferred explanation with respect to the criteria , that is, for every such that ; j= , if j= ! , then j= ! .
For example, suppose = fq^r ! p; s ! qg and let p denote the phenomenon to be explained; if = fr ! sg then s^r is preferred to q^r. Clearly the theory may be empty. In that case, preference criteria are satis ed by the entailment relation sic et simpliciter and the context-independent account of preference is obtained. On the other hand, if = then we fall into the context-dependent view.
The need for a theory of preference is compelling when looking for an explanation that is more plausible or more typical than the others, on the basis of some assumptions that are not purely logical in nature. For instance: if there is a lot of traffic on the highway I expect that there is a car accident, and such a typical explanation is to be preferred upon the alternative that an elephant just escaped from the circus is making a performance on the highway. Between the two hypothesis, however, there is no logical relation that can lead to prefer one or the other; the preference has to be represented in separate theory.
When a preference relation is given, what kind of inference is really abduction? If its properties are analyzed, it appears that abduction is a kind of reasoning that is completely di erent from deduction.
Intuitively, the classical consequence relation determines a sort of measure on formulae such that left hand side formulae are stronger than right hand side formulae. Abduction needs the exact inverse measure for formulae: a correct premiss is one that allows as an explanans (given a background knowledge) a weaker formula than the explanandum. While in classical deductive reasoning weakening the consequence is allowed (notice that`right weakening' is admitted also in non monotonic forms of reasoning), in abductive reasoning weakening the explanandum is not correct in general. Brie y, we can say that while non monotonic reasoning di ers from classical deductive inference because of the rejection of left weakening, abduction di ers from both forms of deductive reasoning because it disregards also right weakening.
In this work we address the problem of characterizing abduction by focusing on the key role of minimality and preference criteria, disregarding other albeit important concepts involved in a complete and fair account of abductive reasoning, such as relevance of the explanation, consistency with the background theory, acceptability of the explanans, etc.
In the following section, a de nition of the abduction relation is given, that is parametric w.r.t. the preference relation, and some of its structural and logical properties are studied. Section 3 considers the relation between abduction and non monotonic inference, as well as some aspects of abduction in a non monotonic system.
Properties of abductive inference
In the same way as an abductive inference depends on the logic underlying the background theory 3], it also depends upon the properties of the preference relation that is used.
We assume thereafter that a re exive relation on formulae is de ned: a`preference criterion', that allows two potential explanations to be compared in order to determine whether one of them is better than the other. An explanation is therefore accepted as a good one whenever it is minimal w.r.t. such a relation.
The preference relation can be expressed by means of a preference theory . In fact, de nes the partial order on formulae v , such that v i j= ! . In the following we shall not refer explicitly to , but use the v notation instead, denoting a re exive relation on formulae. It admits indeed greater generality. There are in fact interesting cases where preference is not transitive (see Section 3.2). The symbol < denotes strict preference: < i v and 6 v .
A second parameter we are considering is the logic L that induces the logical consequence relation. We assume that L is either an extension of propositional classical logic, such as rst order logic or modal logic, or the non-monotonic system P (see Section 3.1). This is to ensure the validity of some logical and structural properties that will be used in the sequel. We shall use the symbol`L for derivability in L. We assume that the language of L includes the propositional letter > that is true in every interpretation.
Given a logic L and a preference relation v on formulae, the abductive three-place relation`In the theory , is a good reason for ' will be denoted by `L ;
and it is de ned as follows: 
This rule is correct only if the ordering is preserved by substitution of logically equivalent formulae; this is not the case if, for example, the preference relation is based on some notion of bounded resource reasoning. 7. If v is a well-founded ordering relation, then for any and , there exists such that `L ; .
In general, abductive problems are not bound to have a solution (see 16, 21] ). The above property relates the existence of solutions to the behaviour of the ordering relation. Its validity can be shown by considering that if v is well-founded, then every non-empty set of formulae has minimal elements. Moreover, for any and there exists such that `L ! , so that f j v and `L ! g has a minimal element ', and `L ' ; . As explanatory implication is not logical consequence, many properties that generally hold for logical consequence are in general unacceptable for the abductive relation. Here follows a set of examples, that is is by no means intended to be exhaustive.
The failure of fundamental properties, such as re exivity and transitivity, is paradigmatic of the logical structure of abduction as a completely di erent structure of reasoning than deduction.
1. Re exivity, in the form:
This property holds only if there is no such that `L ! and is strictly preferred to , i.e. < . Observe that the previous condition is, for instance, veri ed whenever is a unit formula and v is the`L relation. 9-E:
Straightforward counterexamples to both rules are when is t] and v is logical consequence. The failure of monotonicity is shared by abductive and non monotonic reasoning, so that it has sometimes led to think that abduction is a specialized form of non monotonic reasoning. See, in this respect, Section 3.1.
The failure of right weakening is the best example of the deep di erence between abduction and any form of deductive reasoning, both monotonic and non monotonic: it is the formal counterpart of what already noticed, that abduction does not allow to weaken the explanandum leaving the explanans unchanged. On the other hand, the failure of And-left shows that it is not possible, in general, to strengthen a preferred explanans, not even by addition of already derivable formulae.
Non Monotonic Logic

Abduction and Non Monotonic Logic
Abductive and Non Monotonic reasoning share a common important property, i.e. non monotonicity. In fact, enriching the background theory can obviously produce new hypotheses that explain the observed event, so that a given explanation may cease to be a minimal one (better hypotheses can be obtained). However, in spite of this apparent common ground, abduction and non monotonic reasoning are di erent forms of inference and, in particular, abduction is by no means a special form of non monotonic inference.
Addressing the relation between abduction and non monotonic reasoning and their combination, we refer to that part of the literature on non monotonic reasoning that has investigated on the nitistic inference operation j (mainly Gabbay The basic (and common to all approaches) idea of non monotonic reasoning is to infer, from a given knowledge of the world, more than it is deductively implied from . The studies about the non monotonic inference relation j have been directed to regulate this strongest inference relation, by adding to the classical inference rules some new rules for j , analogue to the classical ones. A great deal with non monotonic inference systems has been that of establishing a cumulative inference relation. In other words a relation satisfying both cautious monotonicity and non monotonic cut. The import of cumulativity is that whatever is already derivable from given information , does not alter the inference process both when it is added and when it is dropped from . In a cumulative logic, abduction is cumulative, since any inference operation on does not change the set of possible explanantes of a given explanandum.
We assume, here, a relation j for non monotonic inference which is cumulative and furthermore satis es (Or), that is the system of postulates P given in Kraus If we observe that any instance of the general de nition of abduction satis es:
and that Supraclassicality is the opposite, a sort of duality is recognized between the two forms of reasoning. In fact, this is re ected by the intuitive meanings of non monotonic consequence and abductive explanation: (nmr) j : if , normally , i.e. is a good enough reason to believe .
(abd)` ; : is one of the best possible reasons to explain .
So in the rst case may be accepted even if is not one of its classical consequences, in the second case that classically entails is not a su cient condition to accept it as one of the`best' explanations. This fact, together with the observations in Section 2, allow us to conclude that, in spite of the apparent link between the too forms of reasoning, the relation of non monotonic inference with abduction is very loose. Non monotonic logic, in fact, strengthens the inference power of classical logic, while preserving its deductive nature.
Abduction in Non Monotonic logic
In this section we give just some hints on the meaning of a non monotonic abduction. Abduction is by itself an unsound form of reasoning. The inference of an hypothesis that sanctions does not ensures that more information on the current state of a air still validates as a good explanation. In such a case, a revision process should decide of the con ict between the old hypothesis and the new information. This is, however a process that does not strictly attain the formalization of abduction, or at least the formalization of the general de nition.
Boutilier has addressed the formulation of abduction and belief revision as a whole process (see 1]). He argues that even explanations should admit exceptions. In e ect this is what normally happens in common sense explanation. A match is lit is explained by it has been struck, but if the match is wet, this is no longer true. In any explanation we implicitly mean that all the rest is xed, or better, that any other event not causally connected with the phenomenon has been excluded. As van Fraassen says, in the explanation a tacit ceteris paribus clause all else had been the same is included.
So, in what consists abduction when the underlying logic is non monotonic? In order to address this point we need to relate the abductive relation between a theory and a pair of formulae to the notion of proof in the non monotonic system given in 19]. Let K be a set of non monotonic axioms (of the form j ) and a nite set of propositional formulae; we shall identify a nite set of formulae with the conjunction of the formulae in the set. We say that j ; (in K) if j ! is preferentially entailed by K { i.e. it can be derived from K in the system P { and is minimal with such a property; in other words the set K is considered xed. Now, from a formal point of view, we observe that abduction based on non monotonic logic is still shaped in agreement with the observations in Section 2: the same inference rules remain valid and no new rule is validated. In fact, being the abductive rules a subset of the corresponding non monotonic ones, they are all preserved.
However, some observations are in order. Abduction in non monotonic reasoning does not satisfy monotonicity for a supplementary reason: assuming that j ; , not only can ; j ; be false because ceases to be minimal, but also because ; j ! may be no longer true.
The classical example of birds and penguins can be used to illustrate this point.
For simplicity, we assume here that v is monotonic logical consequence. Let K Assume the set K of non-monotonic axioms is xed. Abductive Supraclassicality (ANM-Supraclassicality):
` ; implies j ; does not hold. In fact, in order to establish that j ; , the hypothesis has to be compared with all the elements in f j j ! g, that is obviously a superset of f j ` ! g 4 
Concluding remarks
The discussion in this work shows that a faithful characterization of abduction cannot be hastily settled by saying that abduction is just a calculus exploiting the duality ; ` i ; : `: and the existence of generative deduction methods. Abduction is a peculiar form of inference, that deserves attention as a stand-alone logic. The main issue, at which we are presently working, is the formulation of a suitable semantics, on whose grounds the meaning of the inference rules can be judged, as well as their completeness.
